This paper studies the performance of alternative prediction models for conflict. The analysis contrasts the performance of conventional approaches based on predicted probabilities generated by binary response regressions and random forests with two unconventional classification algorithms. The unconventional algorithms are calibrated specifically to minimize a prediction loss function penalizing Type 1 and Type 2 errors: (1) an algorithm that selects linear combinations of correlates of conflict to minimize the prediction loss function, and (2) an algorithm that chooses a set of thresholds for the same variables, together with the number of breaches of thresholds that constitute a prediction of conflict, that minimize the prediction loss function. The paper evaluates the predictive power of these approaches in a set of conflict and non-conflict episodes constructed from a large country-year panel of developing countries since 1977, and finds substantial differences in the in-sample and out-of-sample predictive performance of these alternative algorithms. The threshold classifier has the best overall predictive performance, and moreover has advantages in simplicity and transparency that make it well suited for policy-making purposes.
This paper studies the performance of alternative prediction models for conflict. The analysis contrasts the performance of conventional approaches based on predicted probabilities generated by binary response regressions and random forests with two unconventional classification algorithms. The unconventional algorithms are calibrated specifically to minimize a prediction loss function penalizing Type 1 and Type 2 errors: (1) an algorithm that selects linear combinations of correlates of conflict to minimize the prediction loss function, and (2) an algorithm that chooses a set of thresholds for the same variables, together with the number of breaches of thresholds that constitute a prediction of conflict, that minimize the prediction loss function. The paper evaluates the predictive power of these approaches in a set of conflict and non-conflict episodes constructed from a large country-year panel of developing countries since 1977, and finds substantial differences in the in-sample and out-of-sample predictive performance of these alternative algorithms. The threshold classifier has the best overall predictive performance, and moreover has advantages in simplicity and transparency that make it well suited for policy-making purposes. The paper explores the implications of these findings for the World Bank's classification of fragile and conflict-affected states.
Introduction
This paper analyzes alternative models for conflict prediction. We work with a country-year panel dataset covering 114 developing countries since 1977, and define a set of conflict episodes based on the frequency of battle deaths, the presence of UN peacekeeping operations, and the proportion of the population forcibly displaced as refugees across international borders. In this dataset, we assess alternative prediction models that seek to distinguish these conflict episodes from complementary nonconflict episodes, using data on a number of country-level covariates observed prior to the start of the episodes. Our interest in this prediction exercise is motivated by the desire of aid donors and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations for a framework that can be used to anticipate the outbreak of conflict.
1 Ideally, the signals of the risk of conflict generated by such a framework open the possibility of policy interventions to reduce the risk of conflict before it occurs, rather than simply reactions to conflict after the fact.
In this paper, we contribute methodologically and pragmatically to the extensive empirical literature on conflict prediction. Our methodological contribution is based on the observation that conventional approaches to predicting conflict, whether based on fitted values from binary response regression models or machine learning algorithms such as random forests, suffer from an internal inconsistency: the objective function that is optimized when the prediction model is fitted to the data is different from the objective function that typically is used to evaluate the quality of the resulting predictions. Consider for example predictions of conflict based on the fitted values from a probit or logit regression model. Estimating the regression model involves maximizing a likelihood function which typically weights all observations equally, and in particular does not assign any particular priority to fitting conflict or non-conflict observations well. The same is true for random forest algorithms, where the branches in the underlying classification trees are chosen to maximize the homogeneity of observations in the resulting subgroups, again weighting all observations equally.
In contrast, forecast performance typically is evaluated using a prediction loss function that assigns specific weights to Type 1 error rates (i.e. the proportion of conflict observations incorrectly classified as non-conflict) and Type 2 error rates (i.e. the proportion of non-conflict observations 3 incorrectly classified as conflict). This inconsistency between the estimation and prediction objective functions can be particularly acute in applications such as conflict prediction, where conflict is a relatively infrequent event. In this case, the small number of conflict observations in the sample carry only a small weight in the likelihood function that is maximized at the estimation stage, but failure to predict conflict when it does occur may carry a high weight in the prediction loss function.
While some ad-hoc solutions that in effect over-weight the relatively infrequent conflict observations at the estimation stage are available, we suggest an alternative, and in our view more direct, approach: using prediction algorithms that are calibrated to directly minimize the same prediction loss function that is also used to evaluate the quality of the predictions. We implement two such algorithms. The first algorithm is similar to predictions based on fitted values from binary response regression models, in that it predicts conflict if a linear combination of correlates of conflict crosses a given threshold. The difference is that the weights in this linear combination are chosen to directly minimize the prediction loss function, rather than to maximize the likelihood function of the binary response model. We refer to this algorithm as the "linear classifier". The second algorithm chooses a threshold for each of the correlates of conflict included in the model, together with the number of breaches of thresholds that constitute a prediction of conflict. The thresholds and the number of breaches are jointly chosen to minimize the prediction loss function. We refer to this algorithm as the "threshold classifier". We contrast the predictive performance of these algorithms with standard predictions based on probit regressions and random forests, and document improvements in predictive performance that come from our proposed approach of using prediction algorithms directly calibrated to minimize the prediction loss function.
Our pragmatic contribution is based on the observation that in some circumstances there may be a tradeoff between the sophistication of a prediction methodology and its suitability for policymaking purposes. For example, an international organization such as the United Nations or the World Bank might want to use an assessment of the risk of conflict across countries as a tool to persuade donor countries to devote resources to aid programs that could help to mitigate the risk of conflict. Such an assessment could also be a crucial part of the policy dialogue with the countries that themselves are identified as being at risk of conflict, and play a role in the process of persuading them to accept assistance and adopt reforms that might reduce the risk of conflict. In such a setting, the acceptability of the framework for identifying risks of conflict might in part depend on the simplicity and transparency of the underlying model that is used to generate the predictions of conflict.
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As the techniques used for conflict prediction have become increasingly sophisticated, evolving from predictions based on simple logit and probit regressions to tools from the machine learning literature such as random forests and neural networks, there is a risk that the predictions generated by more sophisticated models, even though possibly more accurate, may be less useful to policymakers in these circumstances. In contrast, the threshold classifier we propose is arguably one of the most straightforward and intuitive prediction algorithms for policymakers to understand. This is because the threshold classifier has a very simple form: given data on indicators of conflict, we predict conflict if more than ≤ of the indicators cross a pre-specified threshold value for each of the indicators.
In fact, the threshold classifier we propose can be thought of as a more rigorously-founded generalization of the rule that the World Bank currently uses to identify countries at risk of conflict. The current rule is based on IDA countries' scores on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) that are carried out by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the African Development Bank, as well as the presence of a UN and/or regional peacekeeping or peacebuilding operation.
Specifically, countries with CPIA scores below 3.2 (on a 1 to 6 scale), and/or a UN peacekeeping operation in the previous three years, are classified as "fragile situations", and become the focus of conflict-prevention interventions. This rule is a threshold classifier with = 2 indicators and corresponding thresholds (CPIA scores, with a threshold of 3.2, and a dummy for UN peacekeeping operations, with a threshold of 0), together with an aggregation rule that signals risk of conflict if at least = 1 of these two thresholds is crossed. 2 The threshold classifiers we study in this paper are motivated by this simple policymaker-friendly rule, but we generalize it by considering a longer list of explanatory variables, and more importantly, by choosing the corresponding thresholds and the number of breaches required to signal conflict optimally to minimize a prediction loss function.
This threshold-based decision rule for classifying conflict episodes is simpler and more transparent than approaches that base predictions on a weighted average of predictors of conflict, and also is simpler than more sophisticated machine learning algorithms such as random forests.
Interestingly, in our dataset we find that this pragmatic advantage of the threshold classifier does not come at the cost of worse predictive performance. In most cases that we consider, the threshold classifier also generates the lowest values of the prediction loss function among the different 2 Another example of a threshold classifier in regular policy use is the World Bank/IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income countries. This framework features a set of thresholds for five different debt burden indicators, together with a rule that predicts a risk of debt servicing difficulties or "debt distress" if any of these thresholds are breached.
5 alternatives we consider. This combination of simplicity and good predictive performance makes the threshold classifier an appealing option for operational policymaking purposes.
While we develop the methodological and pragmatic contributions of this paper in the specific setting of conflict prediction, both have wider relevance in other settings as well. In recent years there has been a strong movement among empirical economists to apply predictive tools from the machine learning literature to a variety of economic applications (see for example Mullainathan and Spiess (2017) and Athey (2017) for recent reviews of this trend). In cases where these applications involve binary predictions (e.g. poor vs. non-poor, employed vs. unemployed, etc.), it may also be possible to improve the performance of prediction algorithms by eliminating the inconsistency between the estimation and prediction stages that we emphasize in this paper. Similarly, the point that simple prediction algorithms may be better suited for policy purposes carries over to other settings as well. For example, many antipoverty programs are intended to be targeted to a particular group of beneficiaries below a certain income threshold. In cases where it is difficult to observe income directly, these programs rely on "proxy means tests" to identify beneficiaries based on a small number of more easily-observable characteristics. Both the practical implementation of such a targeting rule, as well as its political acceptability to those who pay for and benefit from the program, may be enhanced by having a simple and transparent algorithm such as the threshold classifier.
The application of our contributions to conflict prediction builds on a large empirical literature that has analyzed why some countries experience conflict while others do not. Much of this literature is surveyed in Miguel (2010), and World Bank (2011) contains an extensive discussion of this literature and its implications for development policy. This literature has emphasized factors such as ethnic tensions (Kalyvas (2008) , Fearon and Laitin (2003) ), economic greed or grievances (Collier and Hoeffler (1998) , Collier and Hoeffler (2002) , Collier and Hoeffler (2004) ), geographical factors and natural resource endowments (Ross (2004 ), Fearon (2005 ) and even the effects of climate change (Hsiang et. al. (2013) ). Hegre and Sambanis (2006) is an important early attempt to assess the robustness of the many findings in this literature, using a variant of extreme bounds analysis to identify a small set of consistently-significant predictors of conflict.
A growing number of papers have built on the insights of this literature to develop models for predicting conflict, and Cederman and Weidmann (2017) provide a recent non-technical overview.
Many of these follow the conventional regression-based approach, estimating econometric models of conflict using probit or logit models in panel datasets, and then use the fitted values of these to predict 6 subsequent conflict events. In this sense, these studies are conceptually similar to the "probit classifier"
that we analyze in this paper. Papers in this category include Hegre et. al. (2013) the conflict prediction literature -is that it is difficult to make any claims of external validity of the methodological choices we make here. Papers like ours can only show that a particular classification algorithm works well in a particular dataset, and it is not possible to claim that the preferred approach in this setting -the threshold classifier -would perform as well in other datasets and applications.
Nevertheless, the simplicity of the threshold classifier that makes it arguably more suitable for policymakers is an advantage of this approach regardless of the specific dataset to which it is applied.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the different algorithms for predicting conflict, distinguishing between those that are calibrated to minimize a prediction loss function that those that are not. Section 3 describes the methodology for identifying conflict episodes, and introduces a set of correlates of conflict motivated by the existing literature, that we use to test the 8 conflict prediction algorithms. Section 4 contains our main empirical findings, and Section 5 offers concluding observations and a discussion of policy implications.
Prediction Models for Conflict
Our objective in this paper is to assess models for predicting conflict events. The conflict events we work with are binary --either conflict occurs or it does not. Predictions of conflict events are often most useful when they also are binary --either we predict that conflict will occur, or will not occur --for two reasons. First, a policy rationale for having predictions of conflict is that they can trigger a remedial response on the part of policymakers and aid donors to reduce the risk of conflict. Such mobilization of resources is best done in response to a clear binary prediction, rather than a vague statement that conflict is more or less likely. Second, we will be choosing among different prediction rules based on an evaluation of their predictive performance. While there are tools to evaluate continuous or density predictions of binary variables, the most common approach is to generate binary predictions to match the binary outcomes, and then evaluate how often predictions are "right" and how often they are "wrong".
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In Section 3, we define a set of conflict events and complementary non-conflict episodes. Let be a binary indicator taking the value one if episode is a conflict episode, and zero otherwise; and let * denote the corresponding prediction of conflict, i.e. * is equal to one if we predict conflict, and zero otherwise. When evaluating these predictions, we care about both Type 1 errors (failing to predict a conflict episode or "missed calls", i.e. = 1 but * = 0) and Type 2 errors (incorrectly predicting conflict when conflict does not occur or "false alarms", i.e. = 0 but * = 1)
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. We evaluate the predictions of conflict using a prediction loss function that penalizes the rate of both types of errors, i.e.
(1)
where the rates of the two types of errors in the sample of interest are 1 = ∑ * ∑ and 2 = ∑ ( ) *
∑ ( )
; and and 1 − are the weights on Type 1 and Type 2 errors. In the empirical results that follow we set = 0.5. Although we assign equal weight to the rate of Type 1
and Type 2 errors, since conflict episodes are relatively infrequent, this implies that we are assigning a higher value to correctly predicting conflict episodes than to correctly predicting non-conflict episodes.
We consider four methods for generating predictions of conflict, * , based on a x 1 column vector of observable covariates for each episode, . In keeping with the objective of providing predictions of future conflict based on currently-available information, the covariates are observed prior to the beginning of each episode. However, to conserve on notation, we do not explicitly denote this temporal ordering. In the next two subsections we describe the two conventional prediction rules (based on probit regressions and random forests) and the two unconventional prediction algorithms (the linear and threshold classifier calibrated to minimize the prediction loss function) that we consider.
Section 2.3 briefly discusses implementation issues for the linear and threshold classifiers.
Prediction Algorithms Based on Binary Response Regressions and Random Forests
Conflict predictions based on fitted probabilities from binary response regression models are common, and consist of two steps. The first step involves estimating a binary response regression model relating the observed outcome to the explanatory variables, i.e.
(2) = 1 = ( + )
where (. ) is a cumulative distribution function and ( , )′ is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
The second step is a rule which predicts conflict if the fitted probabilities from the binary response model are greater than some cutoff value * , i.e.
The cutoff value * is chosen to minimize the prediction loss function in Equation (1), given the estimated parameters of the probit model, and . The binary response model is most commonly a probit or a logit specification, corresponding to a choice of Gaussian or a logistic distribution for (. ).
In this paper we report results using a probit specification, and refer to this approach as the "probit classifier". Our findings are virtually identical if we use logistic regressions.
The top panel of Figure 1 illustrates the probit classifier for a hypothetical dataset in which there are = 2 explanatory variables for each episode, and . The orange round data points correspond to observations with no conflict, i.e. pairs of and for which the corresponding = 0, while the blue square data points correspond to pairs of and for which conflict is observed, i.e. = 1.
The downward-sloping line traces out the boundary between predicted conflict and non-conflict, i.e. the set of points where ( + + ) = * . Points above this line correspond to pairs of and where the probit classifier predicts conflict, while points below the line correspond to predictions of no conflict. Therefore, square data points lying in the upper-right shaded region correspond to correctly predicted conflict events, while the round data points in this region correspond to false alarms.
Similarly, in the region below the line, square data points correspond to missed conflict events, while round data points correspond to correctly-predicted non-conflict events. Note that the slope of the boundary line depends only on the ratio of the estimated probit coefficients, / . However, the intercept of the line is determined by the cutoff probability * . Optimally choosing the cutoff probability involves parallel up-and-down shifts of this line to find the location which minimizes the prediction loss function in Equation (1).
This prediction rule is very intuitive, and has the added advantage that it connects naturally with the large empirical literature on correlates of conflict that has estimated many different versions of Equation (2). The difficulty with this approach however is that it is not at all clear that it is the best possible prediction rule given the observed data and the loss function in Equation (1). As discussed in Elliott and Leili (2013) and Elliott and Timmerman (2016, Chapter 12) , the problem is that the likelihood function that is maximized in the estimation of the binary response model implicitly treats prediction errors differently than the objective function that is optimized in the selection of the cutoff probabilities. 5 Moreover, these two objective functions could very well be contradictory. The key issue 5 Note that the maximum likelihood problem for probit estimation is:
The term inside the summation is the log-likelihood function for an individual observation. It consists of two terms that are treated symmetrically. The first term rewards values of the parameters that assign a high fitted probability ( + ) to conflict episodes where = 1, while the second term rewards values of the parameters that assign low fitted probability to non-conflict epsides where = 0. The first term is analogous to is that the likelihood function treats both types of errors symmetrically, and moreover weights each observation in the sample equally. This means that the implicit weights on the rates of Type 1 and Type 2 errors at the estimation stage can be very different from those used to choose the cutoff probabilities that generate the predictions. For example, if the sample happens to contain many non-conflict observations, the estimation procedure will implicitly assign more weight to finding parameter values that correctly predict non-conflict episodes, and will not assign much weight to correctly predicting conflict. As a result, the objective function in the estimation stage is different from the one in the prediction stage, which explicitly chooses the cutoff probability * to minimize the prediction loss function. Returning to the top panel of Figure 1 , the downward-sloping line that defines the probit classifier has a slope and an intercept that are chosen to optimize different and potentially-contradictory objective functions.
A similar issue arises with predictions based on random forests. As with the probit classifier, predictions based on random forests are a two-step process: (1) fitting a random forest to the data, and (2) retrieving the predictions for each observation and finding a cutoff to classify observations as conflict or non-conflict. Random forests are a collection of classification trees that are fitted to bootstrapped subsamples of the data. Classification trees themselves are sequential binary partitions of the explanatory variables that seek to best discriminate between conflict and non-conflict observations at each partition of the data. The bottom panel of Figure 1 illustrates a two-level classification tree for the same hypothetical dataset as the top panel. In this two-variable example, a classification tree can be constructed by first finding a threshold for that provides the best separation between conflict and non-conflict episodes. The next step is to find two distinct thresholds for , conditional on being above its threshold, , or below its threshold, , that provide the best separation between conflict and non-conflict episodes in these two subsamples. The observations in the resulting four regions, or terminal "nodes", are predicted as conflict or non-conflict based on the majority of observations within the terminal nodes.
Random forests are a technique for improving the predictions of individual classification trees by
averaging across a large number of trees fitted to bootstrapped subsamples of the data. The basic idea is to generate independent classification trees in randomly-selected subsamples of the data, and based on randomly-selected subsets of the explanatory variables. The individual classification trees are grown the complement of Type 1 errors, i.e. correctly-predicted conflict episodes or "sensitivity", while the second term is analogous to the complement of Type 2 errors, i.e. correctly-predicted non-conflict episodes, or "specificity".
to be very "deep", so that only a small number of observations remain in each terminal node.
Individually these trees are noisy predictors, but averaging across a large number of them results in more stable predictions. Specifically, at each bootstrap iteration, a classification tree is fitted to a subsample of the data, and the fitted classification tree is used to predict the outcome in the remaining data not used for fitting the tree. These "out-of-bag" predictions are aggregated across all trees, and the proportion of trees classifying a particular observation as conflict can be interpreted as a prediction of the likelihood of conflict for that observation. Just as in the binary response regression approach, these proportions or "vote counts" can be compared with some cutoff value above which a prediction of conflict is generated. We select this cutoff value for the vote counts to minimize the prediction loss function.
Classification trees use the criterion of "node purity" to determine the optimal thresholds at which to split the data at each branch of the tree. Most commonly this criterion takes the form , where and denote the proportion of conflict observations in the subsamples of observations below and above the threshold. This criterion is equal to zero in the case of a split that perfectly separates conflict and non-conflict observations, since either = 0 and = 1, or vice versa, corresponding to the case of perfect node purity. Thresholds at each level of the classification tree are set to maximize node purity by minimizing this criterion. Crucially for our purposes, the splitting criterion treats all observations symmetrically, and in particular does not distinguish between Type 1
and Type 2 errors. In this sense, the random forest classifier shares the same potential problem that the probit classifier does -the estimation and prediction stages in the algorithm optimize different and potentially contradictory objective functions.
This shortcoming of the probit and random forest classifiers motivates the two other prediction rules we consider, that are discussed in the following subsections. Following the suggestion of Elliott and Leili (2013) and Elliott and Timmerman (2016, Chapter 12) , we focus on prediction rules that are calibrated to directly minimize the prediction loss function of interest. We also note that this potential difference between the objective function at the estimation stage and the prediction loss function is related to the emphasis placed by Muchlinksi et. al. (2016) on the "class-imbalanced" nature of conflict data. Given their definition of conflict, conflict is a very rare event in the sample they study, and they note the benefits of relying on "rare-events" logit estimation, which in effect over-weights the relatively scarce conflict observations, as a way to address this problem. They do not however follow the logic of 13 this observation to the point of this paper, which is to rely on a prediction algorithm that is calibrated to minimize the prediction loss function of ultimate interest.
Prediction Algorithms that Minimize the Prediction Loss Function
In this subsection we discuss two prediction algorithms that avoid the potential contradictions between the estimation and prediction stages in the probit and random forest classifiers by instead directly minimizing the prediction loss function. The first is a simple variant on the probit classifier, which bases predictions on a linear combination of the observed covariates that minimizes the prediction loss function in Equation (1). Specifically, we define this prediction rule:
where, without loss of generality, we can normalize the cutoff value = 1. We then choose the values of that minimize the prediction loss function in Equation (1).
This prediction rule is similar to the probit classifier in the sense that it bases predictions on whether a linear combination of covariates falls above or below some cutoff value. The difference however is that in the probit classifier, the relative weights assigned to the explanatory variables are pinned down by the estimated probit slope coefficients, , while in the linear classifier the relative weights are chosen to directly minimize the prediction loss function that we ultimately care about. To see this more clearly, note that we can re-write the probit classifier as:
is a simple rescaling of the probit slope coefficients. These rescaled probit coefficients are directly comparable to the relative weights assigned by the linear classifier, , and to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we report the rescaled probit coefficients in the tables that follow.
The top panel of Figure 2 illustrates the linear classifier for the same hypothetical dataset as before with = 2 explanatory variables, and . Recall that the orange round data points correspond to observations with no conflict, while the blue square data points correspond to conflict 14 observations. The downward-sloping line traces out the boundary between predicted conflict and nonconflict based on the linear classifier, i.e. the set of points where + > 1. As before, points above this line correspond to pairs of and where the linear classifier predicts conflict, while points below the line correspond to predictions of no conflict. The main difference between the top panel of Figure 1 and the top panel of Figure 2 is that in Figure 2 , both the slope and the intercept of the downward-sloping line are chosen optimally to minimize the prediction loss function. In contrast in the probit classifier in Figure 1 , only the intercept of the line is chosen to minimize classification errors, while the slope is pinned down by the estimated coefficients in the probit regression. As discussed in the previous subsection, this means that the slope of the boundary for the probit classifier reflects the maximum likelihood optimization problem, which assigns different implicit weights to Type 1 and Type 2 errors than does the prediction loss function that we ultimately want to minimize.
This prediction rule is related to a class of machine learning algorithms known as "support vector classifiers". 6 In the case of two explanatory variables as illustrated in Figure 2 , the basic idea behind these algorithms is again to find a line in , -space that best separates observations into predicted conflict and non-conflict episodes. However, the line is chosen to minimize a different objective function from the prediction loss function in Equation (1) that we use throughout. Typically, the support vector classifier uses a loss function that penalizes the magnitude of misclassifications, defined as the Euclidian distance in ( , )-space between each misclassified observation and a band around the separating line. The objective function for the support vector classifier is to maximize the width of this band subject to a penalty for the size of misclassifications. This leads to the same problem as with the probit classifier -the objective function used to calibrate the classifier is not the same as the objective function used to evaluate the predictions. For this reason, we use the linear classifier defined in Equation (4) and the prediction loss function in Equation (1) rather than an off-the-shelf support vector classifier.
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Our last prediction algorithm is a "threshold classifier", that consists of a set of thresholds or cutoffs for each of the explanatory variables, , and a rule that predicts conflict if at least of the cutoffs are crossed, with 1 ≤ ≤ . Specifically, the prediction rule for the threshold classifier is:
where ( ) is an indicator value taking the value one if ≥ and zero otherwise. In the threshold classifier, the thresholds and the minimum number of breaches required to predict conflict, , are chosen to minimize the prediction loss function in Equation (1).
8
The bottom-left panel of Figure 2 illustrates the threshold classifier in the case of = 2
covariates, and where = 1, i.e. at least one threshold needs to be breached to generate a prediction of conflict. This generates an L-shaped shaded region in which conflict is predicted if ≥ or ≥ , and a rectangular complementary region in the bottom-left of the graph where < and < and accordingly, conflict is not predicted. In the case where = 2 is shown in the bottom-right panel of Figure 2 . In this case, the region for predicting conflict would be the rectangular area in the top-right of the graph where ≥ and ≥ , and the remaining unshaded L-shaped region corresponds to predictions of no conflict. The threshold classifier chooses the thresholds, and the minimum number of breaches required to signal conflict, to minimize the prediction loss function.
The main advantage of the threshold classifier is that it generates a very simple and intuitive method for classifying conflict episodes that is easy for policymakers and other non-technical users of the classification rule to understand. We can think of a covariate of conflict breaching its threshold, i.e.
≥ for a given episode as providing some signal of the likelihood of conflict based on that variable. If sufficiently many such signals (i.e. at least such signals) are observed, then the observation is classified as a conflict episode. This simplicity comes at the expense that the orientation of each covariate needs to be specified in advance, such that higher values of the variable correspond to a greater risk of conflict. Otherwise, exceeding the threshold does not constitute a signal of conflict. In many cases there is a natural intuitive orientation --for example, it seems reasonable to suppose a priori that a greater incidence of conflict among neighbors raises the risk of conflict at home. But in other cases the orientation might be unclear. To address this issue systematically, we orient each of the explanatory variables to be consistent with the estimated sign in the corresponding probit regression.
That is, if a variable enters positively in the probit regression (such that higher values are associated with a higher risk of conflict), then we do not reorient the variable. If on the other hand a variable enters negatively in the probit regression, then we reverse the orientation of the variable. To facilitate the interpretation of results, we reorient variables in this way (i.e. based on the signs of the slopes in the probit regression) for all variables and for all the classification rules, even though this step is of course not necessary for the other prediction algorithms.
Implementation Issues
Implementing the probit classifier is straightforward, since it simply requires the estimation of a probit regression, followed by a one-dimensional grid search over cutoff probabilities to find the optimal cutoff probability * that minimizes the prediction loss function. The grid search itself is automated in the lroc command in Stata. To implement the random forest classifier, we rely on the randomForest package in R.
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Implementing the linear classifier and the threshold classifier is more challenging because it involves minimizing an objective function that is flat in much of the parameter space, and otherwise jumps discontinuously. To see why, consider for example the threshold classifier, and consider what happens when we search over candidate values of the threshold for explanatory variable that happen to fall strictly between two adjacent observations and , (assume observations have been ordered by increasing values of ). For any threshold in this range, the conflict/no conflict prediction does not change for any observation, and so the prediction loss function also does not change.
However, when the candidate threshold moves just outside this range by crossing either or , , the classification of observations changes and the objective function changes discontinuously. The size of the "flat" regions of the parameter space and the size of the discontinuous "jumps" in the objective function depend on how large the sample is and how evenly the covariates are distributed over their 9 https://www.rdocumentation.org/packages/randomForest/versions/4.6-12/topics/randomForest relevant ranges. In the fairly small samples we work with (around 500 observations), the objective function is sufficiently flat and discontinuous that standard gradient-based minimization algorithms fail.
A natural alternative to gradient-based minimization is to simply do brute-force grid searches over the parameter space. This however becomes increasingly costly as the number of covariates increases, and particularly so for a reasonably fine grid of candidate parameter values. Instead, we rely on the Nelder and Mead (1965) method, which is a derivative-free heuristic minimization algorithm (available as an option within the Mata optimize module). Since its convergence properties are not known in general, we first verify that the Nelder-Mead algorithm finds a minimum that is close to the one identified by brute-force grid searches, for several examples with up to four covariates for which grid searches are not too computationally costly. To ensure robustness of the minimum identified by this algorithm to the choice of initial parameters, we minimize the prediction loss function for 100
randomly-chosen sets of initial conditions. The distribution of the initial parameters is centered on the probit weights for the linear classifier, and on the median value of each covariate in the conflict sample for the threshold classifier.
Measuring Conflict and Its Correlates
In this section we briefly describe the cross-country panel conflict dataset that we use to evaluate our four prediction algorithms. The first subsection describes our definition of conflict, and the following subsection enumerates the explanatory variables we draw on as predictors of conflict.
Identifying Conflict Episodes
Our starting point is a panel dataset of country-year observations covering 114 developing countries since 1977. As discussed in more detail below, the sample of countries and the time period are dictated by data availability. Our primary measure of conflict is a binary indicator of whether at least 25 battle-related deaths occur in a country in a given year. 10 This is a standard threshold for "minor armed conflicts" used in the literature to capture smaller conflicts, and naturally also includes much rarer civil war events which typically are measured using a higher threshold of 1,000 battle deaths. We supplement this measure with two additional indicators. The first is a binary indicator measuring whether a UN peacekeeping operation (UNPKO) is present in a given country year. This is intended to measure cases in which conflict exists, but is held in check by the presence of a UNPKO, so that battle deaths fall below the threshold for conflict. The second is a dummy variable equal to one if at least 5 percent of the population of a country is involuntarily displaced as refugees across international borders, and zero otherwise. This measure is intended to capture episodes of conflict that may not cross the threshold of battle deaths but nevertheless are sufficiently severe to cause significant involuntary displacement of people. 11 The threshold of 5 percent is somewhat arbitrarily selected, and corresponds to the 99th percentile of all non-zero refugee observations in the data. We next translate these annual country-year observations on conflict into "conflict episodes" that constitute our estimation sample. 12 We are primarily interested in predicting the onset of conflict, rather than its duration. We therefore identify conflict episodes as the first year in which one of the three indicators signals conflict. In many countries, conflict years are immediately preceded by other conflict years. To make sure that only distinct episodes of conflict are identified, we drop conflict episodes that are preceded by conflict in any of the previous three years. 13 Non-conflict episodes are defined as non-overlapping periods of five consecutive years in which none of the three events related 11 Data comes from UNHCR Population Statistics. Data on IDPs are published by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and have various challenges in collection, hence we do not include these data in the analysis. For an in depth discussion please see World Bank (2016) 12 This methodology is similar to Kraay & Nehru (2006) , who define episodes of debt servicing difficulties in a analogous way. 13 An important point of the World Development Report 2011, was that modern violence comes in various forms and repeated cycles.
to conflict take place. The non-conflict episodes begin in the first year for which it is possible to identify five consecutive years with no conflict. As with the conflict episodes, we also require the non-conflict episodes to be preceded by three years of no conflict. We construct the conflict and non-conflict episodes using annual data for 114 countries over the period 1977-2014 for which our core explanatory variables --discussed in more detail below --are available.
14 Through this method, we arrive at a sample of 69 conflict events, and 422 non-conflict events. Our dependent variable in the empirical work that follows is a dummy variable taking the value one for conflict episodes, and zero for non-conflict episodes. The 69 conflict episodes identified are listed in Table 1 , which identifies the country name and the start year of each episode. The list is dominated by Sub-Saharan African countries, but a number of other conflicts from other regions appear as well. The conflict episodes vary in length, with a median length of two years and an interquartile range from one to six years. Some conflict episodes are very prolonged: the 90 th percentile of conflict length is 17 years. In the empirical work that follows, we do not seek to account for this variation in the duration of conflict once it has begun, but rather focus on the prediction of conflict conditional on being in a non-conflict state.
Correlates of Conflict
We work with a selection of variables that have been emphasized in the existing literature as important correlates of conflict (Fearon & Laitin (2003) Purely for presentational purposes, we organize these variables into three broad categories: latent tensions, shocks, and institutions. 15 Since we are interested in models that can predict conflict based on information prior to the beginning of an episode, we measure all explanatory variables as averages over the three years prior to beginning of the conflict and non-conflict episodes. In the category of latent tensions, we include a number of variables that are intended to capture underlying factors contributing to between-group tensions that may escalate into conflict. We use two innovative recent measures of income inequality, both taken from Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou (2016). The first combines satellite night light density --a spatially-disaggregated proxy for per capita income --with maps delineating the boundaries of different ethnic groups, to obtain a proxy for income inequality across ethnic groups. The second simply measures inequality across pixels within a country and therefore proxies for overall spatial inequality. Both measures are available only at decadal frequency, and we linearly interpolate the intervening years to obtain annual data that can be averaged over the three years prior to each conflict and non-conflict event. Following a large literature that has documented the importance of conflict over the income generated by natural resources, we include a measure of natural resource rents as a share of GDP. These are constructed in World Bank (2011) and are based on estimates of the difference between commodity prices and unit costs of production, for a large number of commodities. These are aggregated across commodities produced in a country, and expressed as a share of GDP. We also rely on standard measures of ethnic and religious fractionalization that measure the probability that two randomly-selected individuals in a country will belong to different ethnic or religious groups. We also include the share of men aged 15-29 in the total population, 15 Details on the data sources are in the appendix.
following earlier literature that has documented associations between prevalence of young men and conflict. Finally, in this category of latent tensions, we include the country's history of conflict, defined as the fraction of years since 1970 in which conflict, as defined in our dependent variable, is observed.
In the category of shocks, we gather several types of events that the existing literature has emphasized as increasing the risk of conflict. This category includes two external shocks: the income effect of changes in the terms of trade, which tends to be positively correlated with conflict in our sample, and number of neighboring countries in conflict, which also tends to be positively correlated with conflict in the country of interest. We also include a composite measure of the incidence of natural disasters, taken from Besley and Persson (2011) . This is a binary indicator of whether any of the following types of natural disasters occur in a given country and year: extreme temperature events, floods, landslides and tidal waves. Finally, in this category we include per capita GDP growth, as a crude proxy for other shocks hitting the economy that might contribute to the risk of conflict. Finally, we include in this category the log-level of real GDP per capita, following many papers that have documented a greater prevalence of conflict in low-income countries, and the logarithm of population, following previous papers that have documented an association between country size and conflict. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for these explanatory variables in the three-year period prior to the start of conflict and non-conflict episodes in our dataset. A glance at this table reveals many patterns that would be expected from the large empirical literature on conflict. Income inequality, ethnic fractionalization, income inequality across ethnic groups, natural resource rents as a share of GDP, and the history of past conflict are all on average higher prior to conflict events than non-conflict events. Interestingly, however, religious polarization is on average lower in conflict events. Turning to the variables in the institutions group, per capita income and the CPIA indicator are both lower prior to 22 the start of conflict episodes. The Freedom House and Political Terror Scale variables are both oriented so that higher values correspond to worse outcomes, and we also observe on average higher values of both measures prior to conflict episodes. In the shocks category, growth is lower prior to conflict events, and natural disasters are neighbors in conflict are both higher before conflict. In contrast, positive terms of trade shocks tend to precede conflict events in our sample. in context, note that had we simply predicted conflict at random with a probability equal to the unconditional probability observed in the sample, the prediction loss function would be 50%. 17 The two variables with the best predictive power, i.e. the lowest value of the prediction loss function, in each group are highlighted (ethnic inequality, natural resource rents, Freedom House, Political Terror Scale, real GDP growth, and neighbors in conflict).
Results
In the next two columns of Table 3 , we report the percentile of the distribution of each variable at which the optimal threshold is set, as well as the actual value of the variable at that percentile. In order to interpret the figures in this column, it is important to recall that variables that are negatively correlated with conflict in our sample have been re-oriented to be positively correlated with conflict.
These variables (religious fractionalization, the CPIA, per capita income, real GDP growth, and the income effect of changes in the terms of trade) are indicated with a "*" in Table 3 . For these variables, values below the reported threshold (in percentile and value terms) correspond to predictions of conflict, while for all other variables, values above the reported threshold correspond to predictions of conflict. To take a specific example, the threshold for predicting conflict based on the CPIA is set at the 22 nd percentile of the distribution of re-oriented CPIA scores. This means that observations in the bottom 22 percent of the CPIA distribution would have conflict predicted based on this variable.
Interestingly, the value of this threshold of 3.2 is identical to the one used by the World Bank for many years to determine whether a country should be classified as "fragile"
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In Table 4 we turn to the more interesting question of assessing predictions of conflict based on multiple explanatory variables. When we consider the joint predictive power of groups of correlates of conflict, the different classification rules combine the information from multiple explanatory variables in different ways, with important implications for overall predictive power. We illustrate the differences between classification rules by considering predictions based on three sets of variables. In Model 1 we examine predictions based on a parsimonious set of six variables, selected as the best two predictors of conflict within the three categories of explanatory variables, i.e. the highlighted rows in Table 3 . In
Model 2, we consider predictions based on the set of nine explanatory variables that individually are significantly correlated with conflict at the 95% significance level (based on the z-statistics in the last column of Table 3 ). Finally, in Model 3, we generate predictions based on the full set of all 16 explanatory variables. Naturally, the selection of variables in these three models is somewhat arbitrary,
= (1 − ). Along the same lines, the Type 1 error rate is , and with a weight on Type 1 errors of = 0.5, this implies a prediction loss function of 0.5. 18 Details on this rule for identifying fragile states can be found at: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/154851467143896227/FY17HLFS-Final-6272016.pdf and one could in principle generate predictions based on any combination of explanatory variables. We focus on these three models simply for reasons of space, and assess the predictive power of the alternative classifiers in these three models. In Table 4 , we focus on in-sample predictions. That is, the classification rules are estimated using the full sample of episodes, and then we examine how well the rules classify observations in the same full sample. Out-of-sample predictive power is assessed in Table   5 and the discussion below.
The three vertical panels of Table 4 Moving to Models 2 and 3 with more explanatory variables, the threshold classifier performs better in both in absolute terms and relative to the other classifiers. This is most pronounced for Model
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The remaining rows of (4) and (5) in the previous section). All the underlying variables have been normalized to run from zero to one, so the weights reported in the table can be interpreted as their relative importance in contributing to the predictions of conflict. Given the largely similar predictive performance of the probit and linear classifiers, it is not surprising that they apply broadly similar weights to the different explanatory variables. For example, in Model 3, the correlation across variables of the weights assigned by the probit and linear classifiers is 0.94.
The column for the threshold classifier reports the percentile of the distribution of each explanatory variable at which the optimal threshold is set, i.e. the same as in Column 4 of Table 3 . As before, for the variables marked with a "*" that have been reoriented, the threshold corresponds to the percentile below which a signal of conflict is issued, while for the remaining variables the threshold corresponds to the percentile above which a signal of conflict is issued. Note also the bottom row of Table 4 , where we report the optimal number of breaches of thresholds required to signal a conflict event, which increases from two in Models 1 and 2, to five in Model 3. Finally, for the random forest predictions, we report the mean improvement in node purity for each variable, a standard measure of predictor importance in a random forest classifier. These are normalized to 1 for the least important predictor, with higher values corresponding to a greater improvement in predictive power.
Interestingly, there is some correspondence between the variables identified as important in the threshold classifier and the random forest: in Model 1, the correlation between the measures of importance for the two models is 0.68 (in absolute value). However, this correspondence across methodologies declines as the number of explanatory variables increases, and for Model 3 the same correlation is only 0.13 (again in absolute value).
The analysis in Table 4 focuses on the in-sample predictive power of the different classification rules. In Table 5 we turn to the more important question of out-of-sample predictive power. We do this by dividing the dataset into an estimation sample and a prediction sample, successively using years between 1990 and 2000 as dividing points. 20 The three horizontal panels of the table correspond to 20 In the machine learning literature, it is common to use cross-validation methods in which the dataset is separated into randomly selected subsamples (or "folds"). The model is estimated sequentially leaving out one fold at a time, and then used to generate predictions in the left-out fold. This is repeated across all folds and the average predictive power across the left-out folds is used as a measure of out-of-sample predictive performance.
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predictions based on the same three sets of variables as in Table 4 (i.e. Models 1, 2, and 3), and the rows correspond to different breakpoints. For example, the row for 1990 means that the classification rule was estimated using data between 1977 and 1989, and the predictions are for the period 1990-2014.
Finally, the columns of the table report the in-sample and out-of-sample value of prediction loss function, which summarizes the predictive power of the four classification rules. For ease of comparison, in each row the entry shaded in gray corresponds to the model with the best out-of-sample predictive power in that row, i.e. the lowest value of the prediction loss function.
Several observations about this table are of interest. First, for the probit, linear, and threshold classifiers, on average in-sample predictive power is better than out-of-sample predictive power.
21
While for the more parsimonious Model 1 and Model 2, these differences are not large (a few percentage points), they are more pronounced for Model 3 which generates predictions based on 16
variables. This reflects a tendency of these classification rules to somewhat overfit in sample, with adverse consequences for out-of-sample predictive power. The second observation is that for the probit and linear classifiers, out-of-sample predictive power is best in the most parsimonious Model 1, and declines sharply as additional variables are added in Models 2 and 3. In contrast, for the random forest and threshold classifiers, out-of-sample predictive power improves moving from Model 1 with 6 variables to Model 3 with 16 variables, although the improvement is small.
The final observation concerns the relative out-of-sample predictive power of the four classification rules. A glance at the gray-shaded cells in Table 5 indicates that across all three models and all 11 sample splits, the threshold classifier most often has the best predictive power (in 21 out of 33 cases). The probit classifier has the second-best out-of-sample predictive performance, in 8 cases, although as noted abve the probit classifier does poorly in the less parsimonious Model 3. Finally, the random forest and linear classifiers are only rarely the best predictors, at two cases each.
A natural -and difficult to answer -question is the extent to which these findings, particularly on the superior performance of the simple threshold classifier, generalize to other settings. While there
The approach taken here is conceptually identical, in that the model is estimated in one subset of the data and used to generate predictions in the remaining subset. However, in this country-year panel setting, there is a natural temporal ordering of the data, and splitting the data by time period is arguably a more relevant exercise, as it answers the question: "how would prediction algorithms have fared ex post if we had used them to predict conflict based on the information available as of 1990, as of 1991, etc.?". 21 For the random forest classifier, recall that the in-sample measure of goodness of fit is based on the "out-of-bag" subsamples of the training dataset, and therefore is not comparable with the out-of-sample predictions that are based on the entire prediction sample.
is little we can offer in terms of systematic evidence, in Appendix B we document similar, although less stark, evidence on the relative performance of the different prediction algorithms in the well-known
Hegre and Sambanis (2006) dataset.
Policy Implications and Conclusions
A robust predictive framework for conflict events can provide policymakers with the opportunity to respond more proactively to different risks of conflict, including with policy interventions to address the structural causes or triggers of conflict. This papers aims to strengthen predictions of conflict by evaluating the predictive performance of alternative algorithms that might form the basis for such a framework. We have considered the in-sample and out-of-sample predictive power of four classification rules: two conventional algorithms based on probit regressions and random forests, and two unconventional algorithms designed to directly minimize the prediction loss function -the linear and threshold classifiers. In this particular setting, we find that the threshold classifier dominates the other classification algorithms in terms of in-sample and out-of-sample predictive power, particularly in models with more explanatory variables. Moreover, we have argued that the simplicity of the threshold classifier makes it an attractive tool when conflict predictions are intended to inform policy discussion around aid and conflict-prevention strategies.
While these differences across prediction algorithms are non-trivial, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the out-of-sample predictive power of these methods is modest. While the bestperforming threshold classifier can correctly predict over 90 percent of conflict events, it also incorrectly classifies around 30 percent of non-conflict events as conflict (in Model 3 in Table 4 ). Whether this rather high rate of "false alarms" is acceptable or not depends in large part on the policy purposes for which these classification algorithms are intended. For example, if resources for conflict prevention programs are scarce, allocating them using a classification rule with a high rate of "false alarms" may result in a highly inefficient targeting of these resources to places where they are most needed. This suggests that before using any of these classification algorithms for policy purposes, careful thought should be given to the weight on Type 1 and Type 2 errors in the prediction loss function.
As noted above, a policy goal of an exercise such as this is to inform frameworks for anticipating the outbreak of conflict. To illustrate how the classification algorithms discussed here might do so in practice, we generate a list of countries that would be considered to be at risk of conflict, based on the most recently-available information in our dataset on the various predictors of conflict, and the four 28 classification algorithms. Specifically, we take the average of each of the explanatory variables over the most recent period 2012-2014 included in the dataset, and feed these through all four classification rules to generate four alternative lists of countries "at risk" of conflict according to these models. For comparative purposes we also report the list of countries "at risk" of conflict based on the World Bank criteria for being a "fragile or conflict-affected state". As noted earlier, this classification was based on having CPIA scores below a threshold of 3.2, and/or the presence of a UN and/or regional peacekeeping or peacebuilding operation, and we take the most recent classification of countries (i.e. the World Bank's FY17 list). 22 Finally, we focus only on countries in which none of our three annual indicators of conflict is observed in any of the three years 2012-2014. This is to be consistent with the emphasis in our empirics on predicting transitions from non-conflict into conflict.
The results of this exercise are shown in conflict. This suggests that having such processes in the future be informed by robust classification algorithms would enhance the ability of policymakers to make informed decisions.
It is useful to focus on the fourth column containing the predictions based on the threshold classifier, which as we have shown in the previous section tends to have better predictive power than the other classification rules. The threshold classifier signals a risk of conflict in 37 of the 87 countries reported in Table 6 . Interestingly, there is only one case where the threshold classifier predicts conflict but none of the other classifiers do, which is Belarus. Conversely, there are only a handful of cases where the threshold classifier does not predict conflict but at least two out of three of the other classifiers do: Indonesia, Kyrgyz Republic, Sri Lanka, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, and Zambia. Finally, while not explicitly shown in Table 6 for reasons of space, it is also interesting to document the role of Table 6 .
While a variable with more breaches of its corresponding threshold is more likely to contribute to predictions of conflict, recall that a minimum of five variables must breach their thresholds in order to generate a conflict prediction. Thus, it also matters how often a given variable crosses its threshold for countries for which at least four other variables cross their own thresholds as well. To capture this notion of specificity, we also calculate the proportion of breaches for each indicator that occur in countries where at least four other variables breach as well, i.e. in countries where the threshold classifier signals conflict. The CPIA and the political terror scale stand out in this respect: although these two indicators individually signal conflict in only 9 and 21 countries respectively, in 8 out of 9 cases for the CPIA and in 18 out of 21 cases for the political terror scale, the threshold classifier also predicts conflict with a total of at least five breaches. At the other extreme, the thresholds for spatial inequality and natural disasters are low and these two variables generate 47 and 46 signals of conflict,
respectively. Yet in only 17 of these cases (for spatial inequality) and 23 of these cases (for natural disasters) does the overall threshold classifier predict conflict.
One final observation suggests directions for future work. While we have documented substantial differences across four classification algorithms in terms of predictive performance, even the best-performing threshold classifier has only modest predictive power. An open question is whether some combination of stronger covariates and more robust prediction algorithms can substantially improve over this predictive performance. In identifying such algorithms, the results of this paper suggest two considerations are important: calibrating the prediction algorithm to directly minimize the prediction loss function, and ensuring that the algorithm features a prediction rule that is simple and transparent if the algorithm is to be used for policy purposes. Alesina, Michalopoulos, & Papaioannou (2016) . Ethnic income inequality combines satellite night light density --a spatiallydisaggregated proxy for per capita income --with maps delineating the boundaries of different ethnic groups, to obtain a proxy for income inequality across ethnic groups. Spatial Inequality measures inequality across pixels within a country and therefore proxies for overall inequality. Data is available only at decadal frequency, and we linearly interpolate the intervening years to obtain annual data. Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP) "The Changing Wealth of Nations: Measuring Sustainable Development in the New Millennium" , World Bank (2011). It is based on estimates of the difference between commodity prices and unit costs of production, for a large number of commodities. These are aggregated across commodities produced in a country, and expressed as a share of GDP. Besley and Persson (2011) . This is a binary indicator of whether any of the following types of natural disasters occur in a given country and year: extreme temperature events, floods, landslides and tidal waves.
Neighbors in Conflict
Binary indicator of whether a country has any neighbors in conflict terms of worse predictive power relying on this simple and transparent classification rule relative to more sophisticated alternatives such as the random forest classifier. 
Annex

